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THE LUCE LECTURES ON RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS
Morality in Plague Time:
AIDS in Theological Perspective
Lecture 2: Obligations - Caring for the Sick
Gilbert Meilaender

At some threshold, hard to define, we will conclude that it is
unreasonable to expect people in general to sacrifice themselves
and those to whom they have close personal ties to the general
good. l
In one of the short stories in which he plays a part, a fictional physician
whose name you will immediately recognize, is called to the bedside of a
dear friend who is dying of a little known, but highly infections disease .
Not realizing how dreadfully contagious is his friend's illness, the doctor
steps toward the bed .
"Stand back! Stand right back!" said he with the sharp imperiousness
which 1 had associated only with moments of crisis .... "
Taken aback, the physician assumes his friend is delirious, but that
impression is immediately corrected . "I know what is the matter with
me . . .. It is infallibly deadly, and it is horribly contagious."
To which Dr. Watson replies : "Good heavens, Holmes! Do you suppose
that such a consideration weighs with me for an instant? It would not affect
me in the case of a stranger. Do you imagine it would prevent me from
doing my duty to so old a friend?"2
Against this wonderful evocation of the meaning of the physician's
calling, enunciated, we should note, by one who is himself a physician and
not by an outsider deliberating about the obligations of physicians , let us
place another paragraph from another work offiction. In Defoe's Journal
of the Plague Year, the saddler who narrates the story writes briefly of
events after the plague had begun to abate and many who had fleq returned
to their homes.
Great was the reproach thrown on those physicians who left their patients
during the sickness, and now they came to town again nobod y cared to employ
them. They were called deserters , and frequently bills were set up upon their
doors and written . " Here is a doctor to be let," so that several of those physicians
were fain for a while to sit still and look about them , or at least remove their
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dwellings and set up in new places and among new acquaintance. The like was the
case with the clergy, whom the people were indeed very abusive to, writing verses
and scandalous reflections upon them , setting upon the church door, "Here is a
pUlpit to be let ," or sometimes, "to be sold ," which was worse . .. . The
Dissenters reproaching those ministers of the Church with going away and
deserting their charge, abandoning the people in their danger, and when they had
most need of comfort, and the like , this we could by no means approve, for all
men have not the same faith and the same courage, and the Scripture commands
us to judge the most favourably and according to charity.
A plague is a formidable enemy, and is armed with terrors that every man is not
sufficiently fortified to resist or prepared to stand the shock against . . .. And we
should have considered that such a time as this of 1665 is not to be paralleled in
history, and that it is not the stoutest courage that will always support men in such
cases ... . I recommend it to the charity of all good people to look back and
reflect duly upon the terrors of the time , and whoever does so will see that it is not
an ordinary strength that could support it. It was not like appearing in the head of
an army or charging a body of horse in the field , but it was charging Death itself
on his pale horse ; to stay was indeed to die, and it could be esteemed nothing
less . ... " 3

Is this not a little closer to what must be said by a third party, an outsider
seeking to consider what Dr. Watson and his colleagues ought to do when
pursuit of their calling means considerable personal risk? What Dr.
Watson quite readily says to Holmes might have been unseemly if spoken
to the good doctor by Mrs. Hudson. And yet , as the citizens of London
had some sense of the obligations of physicians, even an outsider can gain
some understanding of a calling not his own. It is in that spirit that I turn to
consider the obligations of caregivers to patients with AIDS (or patients
who are HIV+). But, keeping in mind my own calling, I shall begin
elsewhere.
Near the end of St. Augustine's life, as North Africa was threatened in
the early 5th century by barbarian attacks, an African bishop , Honoratus,
had written Augustine, asking whether it might be permissible for a priest
to flee in order to escape the threat. 4 We do not have that letter, but it
appears from Augustine's reply that Honoratus must have appealed to a
number of possible scriptural warrants. He seems to have quoted Jesus'
words to the Twelve in Matthew 10:23: "When they persecute you in one
town , flee to the next." As precedent, he also appealed to an escape by St.
Paul from Damascus, when Paul was let down over the city wall in a
basket at night in order to escape those who were plotting to kill him (Acts
9:25; 2 Cor. 11:33). And Honoratus may even have appealed to the
example of Jesus Who, as an infant, escaped into Egypt, fleeing from
Herod . Why, he wanted to know, could not a priest of the Church do
likewise?
An Interesting Response
Augustine's response is both interesting and instructive - especially for
us as we think about the obligations of caregivers in risky circumstances.
Discussions within the public forum about these obligations have tended
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to give voice to two positions. Some, a minority I believe, have contended
that it was quite acceptable for physicians (or other health care personnel)
to refuse to run the risk of treating AIDS patients. Others have responded
by appealing to the obligation of the physician to care for anyone who is ill.
We can, I think, learn from the Bishop of Hippo that the moral life is more
complicated than either of these views alone.
The fundamental principle laid down by Augustine in responding to
Honoratus is simple and straightforward: "There should be no shirking of
the duties of our ministry laid upon us by the charity of Christ" (p. 141). At
the same time, however, he grants that under some circumstances, a priest
might permissibly try to escape. For example, consider the case of St. Paul
fleeing Damascus. He was right to do so, Augustine thinks, for his enemies
were seeking only him - not Christian clergy generally. Hence, he could
rightly escape, thereby preserving himselffor future work on behalf of the
Church , yet still be certain that Christians left behind would not be
deprived of the care they needed. They could get that care from others who
were not being sought and , hence, had no need to flee . s This exception,
though perhaps an interesting one, is not likely to seem very relevant to the
problem that concerns us , but consider some of Augustine's other
suggestions.
Long before the day of cost-benefit analysis , Augustine examines the
contingencies involved. "We should not desert the plain duties of our
office, which are certain, for the sake of contingencies which are uncertain"
(p . 144). It is right to ask about the degree of risk involved , though, of
course, ordinary cost-benefit analysis must blow up in the hands of one
who reminds us to reckon into our calculations the fact that God is able, if
He so wills, to turn away the evils that threaten us in the performance of
our duty! But more important is the principle hinted at in Augustine's
treatment of St. Paul's escape and developed explicitly elsewhere in the
letter: Flight by a priest is permitted as long as others still remain to
provide priestly care for Christians left behind. Indeed , this principle is
more important even than the permission to flee that Augustine deduced
from the example of St. Paul. Suppose Paul had been the object of attack
but, in his absence, no one else would have remained in Damascus to
provide priestly care for Christians. Then he must remain, trusting in God
to turn away the evil that threatens. Thus Augustine summarizes his basic
principle, suitably qualified , in this way:
Let the servants of Christ, the ministers of His word and of His sacrament, do
what He has commanded or permitted. Let them by all means flee from city to
city when anyone of them is personally sought out by persecutors, so long as the
Church is not abandoned by others who are not thus pursued . .. (pp. 142f.).

Honoratus might have been pardoned , however, had he tried one last
parting shot. We don't know that he did , but he might have asked
Augustine whether he was not expecting too much of our frail humanity whether he had not enunciated too rigorous a standard for many of us to
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attain. After all, compassion for sufferers is , in certain ways, an unreliable
motive . Our ability to feel compassion for others who suffer does not
necessarily give us the strength needed to stand firm and help them .
Rather, it may suggest a sensitivity to suffering easily transmuted into fear
for ourselves and our own plight. Helping them, we too may suffer. What
then?
Augustine recognizes at several points in his letter that one might be
"overpowered" by fear or panic. What we must do then, he counsels , is
pray for the charity that is from God - the charity that says, "Who is weak
and I am not weak?" (p. 146). If God commands us to stay at our post, we
must pray that He will give what He commands , Augustine writes , calling
irresistibly to mind one of the famous refrains of Book X of his
Confessions. 6 This appeal to the grace of God is, of course, not available to
us in the public forum where discussions of health care ordinarily take
place. But even that fact - that such an appeal is not available - is
instructive. It suggests that we should be careful not to set the standard of
obligatory behavior too high in contexts where we are unprepared to
appeal, as Augustine does here, to the grace of God needed to empower
such behavior.
In the statement, "The Many Faces of AIDS : A Gospel Response", the
U. S. Catholic Conference Administrative Board commented on the
question that concerns us here.7 Its statement received a great deal of
media attention because of the controversy surrounding its seeming
endorsement of public educational efforts which included information
about use of prophylactics as a means for preventing the spread of AIDS.
But the statement was far more wide-ranging, including, for example, the
following sentences:
We are greatly concerned that some in the health care professions or working in
health care institutions refuse to provide medical or dental care for persons
exposed to the AIDS virus or presumed to be "at risk." We call upon all in the
health care and support professions to be mindful of their general moral
obligation, while following accepted medical standards and procedures, to
provide care for all persons, including those exposed to the AIDS virus. s

Interestingly, this statement articulates the responsibilities of caregivers
without distinguishing obligatory from supererogatory performance,
without Augustine's sense that grace might sometimes be needed to
empower performance. Whether this is a sufficiently nuanced understanding is precisely the problem we want now to consider.

Thoughts About Obligations
One common way of thinking about the obligations of physicians and
other health care personnel is to consider the degree of risk : to weigh the
benefits to patients of care against possible costs to caregivers. But all this
really does , I think, is encourage us to ask questions which cannot be
straightforwardly answered - leaving us, then, simply to follow our
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inclinations or intuitions. How great a risk does the physician run in
treating AIDS patients? Not very great, we are customarily told . That
answer assumes, of course, that the results of about five years of study and
experience will hold up in the longer run , and the scientific temperament
itself might advise caution about such a judgment. Perhaps the answer
may also seem more persuasive to a psychiatrist than to, say, a
nephrologist or surgeon . Then, too , the answer does not itself instruct us
how to reckon into our calculations the fact that the risk, even if small in
degree, is deadly should it become reality. I suppose physicians are more at
risk of contracting the common cold than the AIDS virus - which only
suggests that degree of risk may not be the most important consideration. I
am not persuaded that such approaches are likely to enhance our capacity
to discern what a caregiver ought to do , and I turn therefore in a different
direction .
The AIDS crisis has stimulated considerable reflection on the nature of
the medical profession and the obligations to which professional status
gives rise . Indeed, this may be one of the few obviously good results of an
otherwise terrible disease. And one point has begun to become clear, or so
it seems to me: namely than an ethic which understands the physician /
patient bond in purely contractual terms will not be sufficient to undergird
a strong sense of physician responsibility. Thus, for example, Abigail
Zuger and Steven Miles - themselves physicians - write that we need to
move away from a "rights model" or a "contract model" of medical care
toward a "virtue-based model."9 To think of medical care as a right may
impose obligations upon society to provide it, but that model is not likely
to constrain the freedom of individual physicians to accept or not accept
patients whose care may involve some risk. Only in certain circumstances,
as for example a physician employed in a public hospital, would this model
generate obligations for particular physicians. Similarly, a contract model
is likely to obligate only within narrow limits. Physicians need not accept
any and all patients, and, just as patients are free to sever the relationship
at any time, so also are physicians, "provided the patient is given sufficient
opportunity to find another physician."10

In Quest of an Ethic
In their search for an ethic that will more strongly require physicians to
take considerable risks in serving patients, Zuger and Miles turn to the
concept of virtue. Because of their professional commitments, physicians
need to develop certain virtues - the behavioral skills which will sustain
them in faithfully caring for the sick. Zuger and Miles believe that this
conception may better undergird physician responsibilities to care for
AIDS patients. Those physicians who "decline to perform ... are falling
short of an excellence in practice implicit in their professional
commitment."11 Zuger and Miles might well have quoted an article which,
in fact, they do cite in their notes - Leon Kass's profound and moving
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interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath. Kass notes that the oath does not
set forth , chiefly, contractual obligations to patients; instead , it articula tes
an obligation to one's teachers and to the profession. "The physician
stand s in the world not as one who claims his rights or demands his due ;
rather he stands gratefully, thankful for the existence of the art of
medicine, for the devotion of his teacher, for the community of likeminded healers, and for the privilege of sharing in this noble work."1 2 The
emphasis, thus, is not on obligations to patients but on commitment to the
physician's art and the virtues it requires . If this seems self-serving - if,
indeed , it has sometimes in practice been self-serving - Kass is quite right
to point out that such a conception may bind a physician far more strongly
than any contract would be likely to do. "It obliges always and
unconditionally the physician's full performance, regardless of the
behavior of the patient or his ability to pay."1 3 It obligates, that is , because
it commits the physician to the attempt to be or become a person of a
certain sort, and it makes integrity central to that ideal of excellence.
This turn to the virtues , to an attempt to depict the meaning of
professional commitment on the part of physicians or other caregivers, is
surely attractive in many ways. Indeed, it is, I think, a turn in the right
direction. But as it stand s, it is too unqualified. We need to add some
complexities that arise when we remember (I) others to whom physicians
may have obligations, and (2) that it is not wise to permit the whole of a
person's identity to be swallowed up in his or her professional
commitment.
Call to mind a picture deeply entrenched in our cultural and religious
consciousness: A young knight dressed in armor, carrying lance, sword
and helmet , rides his war charger out of Assisi to do battle against a
neighboring town in 12th century Italy. He is a brave youth, but, seeing a
wretched leper along the road, he spurs his horse to flee the dreadful sight.
As he gallops by, however, he seems to recognize Christ in the contorted
face of the outcast. Abruptly he stops , dismounts, kisses the leper, gives
him alms, seats him on his charger, and leads him to his destination. The
virtues St. Francis displays here are not unlike those of the Samaritan in
Jesus' well-known story. Heedless of his own concerns or needs, that
Samaritan, too , helped a man lying by the roadside. And in telling the
story, Jesus makes clear what we owe any human being in need . The story
is powerful precisely because it confronts us with a pristinely pure situation
of one human being in need and another equipped to bring help . The
Samaritan evidently has no children back home whose needs require that
he keep some money in his checkbook. But this is not the way life often
seems to be for most of us, who may not be called to be St. Francis.
Very often - almost always, surely - we find ourselves committed in
different ways to different people, and , therefore, obligated in a number of
ways. To describe such circumstances in the language of virtue will not
dissipate our problem. The compassion and loyalty a woman physician
feels for her patients are not virtues entirely distinct from the compassion
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and loyalty she feels for her children. Suppose she is a nephrologist who
must dialyze HIV+ patients. Suppose also that she is pregnant. What are
her obligations? What would virtues like compassion and loyalty dispose
her to do? I, at least, would not be prepared to argue that her professional
commitment unremittingly requires her to dialyze those patients. The
profession of physician does not swallow up the totality of her life. As
Augustine thought, albeit with some reluctance, that a priest might flee so
long as another remained behind and the Christian community was not
abandoned, one might argue that such a physician, assuming she does not
abandon her patients to no care at all, does no wrong and falls short of no
excellence the profession of physician requires.
This argument should not be pressed too far, however. Such a physician,
I have suggested, is bound by other ties as well, not only by the
commitments of her profession. She may, for example, consider carefully
what she owes her children, or the unborn child she is carrying, when
deciding her duties as a nephrologist. Just as physicians have always had to
make such judgments in the most elementary of ways - when they parcel
out their time between profession and family - so also in these
circumstances the physician's selfhood is not swallowed by her
professional commitment or, if it is, it ought not be. But at the same time,
she dare not forget that her most important legacy to her children may be
the image of care-full, self-giving commitment to the needs of others which
she imprints upon their memory. We may conclude that turning from a
contract-based to a virtue-based model of medical care will not
unqualifiedly obligate physicians, even though this model may well
capture more successfully the meaning of professional commitment.
Criticism of Recommendation
From a rather different direction, Edmund Pellegrino has criticized the
recommendation of Zuger and Miles that we learn to think of the medical
profession in terms of its characteristic virtues. 14 If I now proceed to
disagree with him as well, I do so with some trepidation, since Pellegrino is
a wise physician from whom much can be learned . He is dissatisfied with
the argument of Zuger and Miles because - staking so much on the
concept of virtues, excellences that should be developed within the
profession - it suggests, erroneously he argues , that "altruism is
nonobligatory" for physicians. By contrast, he claims that there are three
reasons internal to the profession of medicine which distinguish it from
some other occupations and make altruism obligatory for physicians.
First, the very nature of illness makes the sick person especially
vulnerable and dependent, forced to place considerable trust in the
physician. And, Pellegrino writes, such a medical need in itself"constitutes
a moral claim on those equipped to help." This seems to me essentially
correct, but inadequate to support Pellegrino's claim that altruism is
obligatory for the physician. It indicates that medical need constitutes a
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prima facie claim on the physician, but I cannot see that this claim must
always be stronger than others . To remain with the example I used earlier,
the children of a physician are also in a "uniquely dependent, anxious,
vulnerable, and exploitable state" with respect to their parent. Of that
state, we might also say what Pellegrino says of the patient's condition: it
"in itself constitutes a moral claim on those equipped to help ."
The weight of the argument must therefore be borne by the second and
third reasons Pellegrino gives - reasons which are very closely connected.
He argues that those who enter the medical profession "are automatically
parties to a collective covenant" which is not to be interpreted unilaterally
by them, and that "this covenant is publicly acknowledged when the
physician takes an oath at graduation." These are powerful arguments.
Physicians surely owe a considerable debt to the community for the
knowledge and skill they have acquired - knowledge and skill for which
they will be rewarded with considerable affluence. The cost of their
training has been subsidized in certain ways. More important, they are
indebted to generations of patients who have offered themselves as
subjects for experiments or objects of study in a teaching hospital - or,
even, as quasi-experimental subjects in the early years of a physician's
practice. 15 It is important, therefore, that physicians not understand their
care of the sick in purely philanthropic terms, as if they had not also been
needy recipients . Pellegrino is right, I think, to argue that covenant
characterizes the physician's role better than contract and that some
measure of altruism is therefore obligatory.
William F. May, whose viewpoint is not unlike Pellegrino's, has noted
that grounding obligations of physicians in contract is a way of trying to
keep commitments limited - an understandable way, let us hasten to add,
since one may well drown in the sea of human need . Physician contractors,
May says, "dart in and out of the patient's world of need , . .. guard their
own interest, specifying carefully the precise amount of time and service
for sale."16 By contrast, "covenants cut deeper into personal identity ....
Initiation into a profession means, in effect, that the physician is a healer
when healing and when sleeping . .. " (p. 119). This is Pellegrino's point , a
powerful one. We should notice, though, that even Pellegrino does not
press it quite as far as one might have expected. Referring to the
physician's oath, he concludes: "Some degree of effacement of self-interest
is thus present in every medical oath."1 7
Let us pursue that "some degree." I have suggested that obligations of
physicians to patients may be limited by their obligations to others. But,
still more, their obligations may be limited simply because professional
commitment does not encompass the totality of the physician's person. At
some point obligation ceases, and continued service becomes supererogatory. Without thinking of physicians simply as contractors we can and
should say that. How much can be required of physicians? Must one be St.
Francis redivivus to enter the profession? May notes that , interpreted in
ways not unlike his own and Pellegrino's, "a covenantal ethic would appear
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to contribute to a self-consuming, eventually destructive commitment"
(p. 183). We are likely to avoid this , he thinks, only if we do not uproot the
concept of covenant from its original context - a religious one.
One cannot fully appreciate the indebtedness of a human being by toting up the
varying sacrifices and investments made by others in his or her favor. The sense
that one inexhaustibly receives presupposes a more transcendent source of
donative activity than the sum of gifts received from others .... Thus action
which at a human level appears gratuitous, in that a specific gratuity from
another human being does not provoke it, still, at its deepest level, as gift ,
answers to gift (p. 129).

May suggests that such a notion of covenant, grounded in the religious
sense of oneself as an inexhaustibly needy recipient of divine grace, may
produce "an inner freedom and nonchalance that make a deeper
commitment to others possible" (p. 184). It may permit a physician "to
function in a 'hardship post,' . .. without being annihilated thereby"
(p. 184).
I have quoted May at such length because I believe he does, in fact , lay
bare the background beliefs that must underlie Pellegrino's vision of the
physician's role . To the degree that his explication is a perceptive one ,
however, we may again become reluctant to press too rigorous a notion of
physicians' obligations. Zuger and Miles note that, in the face of the
Black Death, many medieval cities hired a "plague doctor": "a municipal
employee who was given a home, a salary, and citizenship; in return he
agreed to 'treat all patients and visit infected places; in as it shall be found
to be necessary,' thus relieving his colleagues of this obligation."18 That is
to say, even in a culture more religious and less pluralistic than ours, the
morality of plague time seemed to fall back upon contract - upon a sense
that certain actions were supererogatory for all who had not explicitly
agreed to undertake them. 19 We may put the point this way: The morality
of plague time, if that is what we actually face , will inevitably force upon
us a two-tiered system of caregivers. One way to structure those tiers is to
distinguish between those physicians who have and who have not
explicitly contracted to face certain threats. Another way is to encourage
the development among some physicians of dedication to service that
goes beyond what can be called obligation. We cannot presume that all
well-intentioned and sincere physicians know what is, in fact, the ultimate
truth: that they are inexhaustibly gifted by a transcendent Giver. And
even for those who do so understand themselves, we cannot presume to
circumscribe the call of God, as if all were called to be like St. Francis.
And we should even be willing to recognize, as Augustine was in a very
different context, that one may be overpowered by fear. We cannot
command courage because, unlike God , we cannot give what we
command . We can only seek to instill it, honor those who exemplify it,
and when we are in need of it, pray, as Augustine says, for the charity
which is from God. 20
August, 1988

31

References
I. Nagel, Thomas, The View From Nowhere (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), p. 202.
2. Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, "The Adventure of the Dying Detective," in The
Complete Sherlock Holmes. Vol. /I (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1930), p. 933. This
passage was first called to my notice in a letter to the editor by Warren Boroson, New York
Times. Nov. 9, 1987. p. 26.
3. Defoe, Daniel, A Journal of the Plague Year Wrillen by a Citizen Who Continued
All the While in London (London : J. M. Dent & Sons, 1908). Everyman's Library Edition,
pp. 269-272.
4. Letter 228 in Saint Augustine, Lellers. Volume V(New York: Fathers of the Church,
Inc .. 1956), pp. 141-151. Citations in the paragraphs that follow will be given by page
number in parentheses within the body of the text.
5. I overlook the fact that Paul. as one who claimed to be an apostle , may in fact have
occupied a position unlike anyone else in Damascus. Augustine simply assimilates Paul's
circumstances to those of a later period in the Church's history, after the development of
certain offices. No doubt Honoratus would have agreed.
6. St. Augustine, Confessions. translated by Rex Warner (New York: New American
Library, 1963), X, 29, 31, 37.
7. Origins. 17 (Dec. 24, 1987), pp. 481-489.
8. Ibid .. p. 485.
9. Zuger, Abigail, M.D. and Miles, Steven H., M.D., "Physicians, AIDS , and
Occupational Risk: Historic Traditions and Ethical Obligations," Journal of the American
Medical A ssociation. 258 (Oct. 9, 1987), pp. 1926f.
10. Ibid .. p. 1927.
II . Ibid.
12. Kass, Leon , Toward a More Natural Science (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 242.
13 . Ibid .. p. 243 .
14. Pellegrino, Edmund D ., M.D. , "Altruism, Self-interest, and Medical Ethics,"
Journal of the American Medical Association. 258 (Oct. 9, 1987), pp. 1939f. Citations of
Pellegrino in the paragraphs that follow will be taken from this two page essay.
15. In addition to Pellegrino, cf. William F. May, The Physician's Covenant
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983), pp. 112ff.
16. May , p. 128. Further citations of May will be identified by page number in
parentheses within the body of the text.
17. Pellegrino, p. 1939. Italics added.
18. Zuger and Miles, p. 1925.
19. Cf. Nagel, p. 204: "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition
from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend
in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect."
20. My thanks to David H. Smith for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

32

Linacre Quarterly

